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Under what conditions should judges be held account-able to their constituents for the decisions they make?In framing our question as we have we are immediately
tipping our hand on two crucial issues: (1) we assume that
judges have constituents, which is, of course, technically true
of more than 90% of American judges, and (2) we imply that
under at least some conditions, accountability is not only
appropriate but required by most theories of liberal democ-
racy.1 Our arguments run as follows:
• In many areas of law, including sentencing, judges are given
by statute an enormous amount of discretion. 
• When law authorizes discretion, law no longer indicates
what specific decision should be made. Any decision that
falls within the range of discretion authorized by law must
be judged to be compatible with the rule-of-law. 
• Judges may base their discretionary decisions on many fac-
tors, including expertise, their own ideological predilec-
tions, their own self-interest, the interests of the workgroup
of which they are a member, and the preferences and inter-
ests of their constituents, to name just a few salient factors.
• The factors upon which judges base their decisions may con-
flict with one another. For instance, when it comes to sen-
tencing, the interests of the courtroom workgroup may clash
with the interests and preferences of the judge’s constituents. 
• References to constituents’ preferences and interests as
“whims” or in other ways irrational are practically never
accompanied by evidence pertaining to the nature of those
preferences and interests. It is improper to assume away a
role in decision making for judges’ constituents by such
prejudicial and entirely non-evidence-based assertions.
• Under a number of conditions, it is appropriate for judges
to base their discretionary decisions on the interests and
preferences of their constituents. Doing so poses no conflict
with hallowed principles such as the rule-of-law.
THE MEANING OF JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
What do we mean when we ask whether judges should be
“accountable” to the public? Judicial accountability encom-
passes judicial responsibility for the conduct of judges as a
whole, for their behavior on and off the bench, and for the con-
tent of their rulings.2 Few would argue, for example, that
judges should not be held accountable for mismanagement of
institutional resources or for violating canons of judicial ethics.
At least as institutional and behavioral notions of accountabil-
ity are concerned, that judges should be held responsible for
their actions seems beyond dispute.
But those are not the only types of accountability. The con-
versation around judicial accountability tends to focus on deci-
sional accountability: the notion that it is good to hold judges
responsible for specific decisions or sets of decisions that they
make. As it concerns Judge Persky’s situation in California,
many of Persky’s constituents who were unhappy with the sen-
tence Persky gave to Turner exercised decisional judicial
accountability when they voted against him at the ballot box.
So too did Persky’s supporters who found Turner’s sentence to
be appropriate.3 Critics of judicial elections oftentimes rebuke
voter decision making and judicial campaigning on notions of
judicial accountability. Many political scientists take a different
view, arguing that such campaigns can provide valuable infor-
mation to voters who are inclined to hold judges accountable
for the decisions they make.4
Judicial accountability is often juxtaposed against judicial
independence.5 Our notion of judicial independence is simple:
judicial independence provides judges with the discretion to
decide cases the way they believe a case should be decided.
Judges who are not independent must decide cases in ways
that they believe are incorrect for either personal or political
reasons. In some countries, for example, judges risk death or
replacement if they rule against the government;6 under these
circumstances, judges lack judicial independence. 
While it is sometimes fashionable to say that judges who are
independent are “accountable to the law,” that need not be the
case.7 Independence simply means that judges are able to make
decisions without fear of reprisal. In doing so, judges may
decide on the basis of many factors, including the law, exper-
tise, their own ideological predilections, their own self-interest
(including ambitions), the interests of the workgroup of which
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they are a member, and the preferences and interests of their
constituents, to name just a few salient factors. Judicial inde-
pendence may contribute to rule-of-law outcomes, but does
not necessarily do so (e.g., judges who base their decisions
solely on their own ideologies).8
Moreover, the relationship between judicial elections and
judicial independence has changed over time. While many
now argue that judicial elections reduce judicial independence,
that has not always been the case. For example, judicial elec-
tions were originally adopted in the mid-1800s as a means of
increasing judicial independence, based upon fears that judges
were too accountable to the state legislators and party leaders
who recommended and appointed them.9 Likewise, Bolivians
adopted judicial elections in 2009 for their national high
courts based upon a promise that judicial elections would
increase judicial independence and reduce corruption.10
Of course, these two concepts have been the subject of volu-
minous debates among legal scholars, and our description here
only scratches the surface of the tension between judicial inde-
pendence and judicial accountability.11 The key points of this
discussion for our argument are simply that judicial indepen-
dence increases opportunities for judges to rely upon whatever
factors they would like—be those legal or otherwise—to make
decisions. And, while decisional accountability is often criti-
cized, the basic notion of judicial accountability for other types
of judicial behaviors is relatively straightforward: just because
someone is a judge does not mean they should not be held
responsible for their conduct.
THE AVAILABILITY OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Judges’ decisions are sometimes said to be incompatible
with the rule of law. But we contend that any decision autho-
rized by statute or precedent or rules of equity is one that is
compatible with the rule of law. Those who criticize judges’
decisions as inconsistent with the rule of law are often doing
nothing more than declaring that they disagree with the deci-
sion. In reality, judicial decision making is difficult to judge
because judges are gifted with unbelievable amounts of discre-
tion.12 This is not particularly surprising; almost every judicial
decision, of almost every type, involves a choice between alter-
native outcomes. And, anyone with even a cursory knowledge
of the opinions of high courts knows that judges often disagree
about which of those alternative outcomes is correct. As much
as Supreme Court nominees like to hail their affinity for call-
ing “balls and strikes,” the craft of judging is discretionary and
difficult, and we observe many good-faith disagreements
among competent and qualified judges about how a case
should be resolved.13
What explains these dis-
agreements? In some cases, law
is very clear and constrains the
legitimate outcomes a judge can
reach. If a road has a speed limit
of 25 miles per hour and a driver
is clocked by a police officer
(who is using a correctly cali-
brated tool) as operating her or
his motor vehicle at 40 miles per
hour, a judge has relatively little
discretion in how the defen-
dant’s speeding ticket should be resolved. In the absence of facts
to the contrary, the defendant has committed the crime of speed-
ing. The law is clear in that case.
Most cases are not that easy. Typically, the law is indetermi-
nate, providing judges with legitimate discretion that supports
a range of possible outcomes. This is true with regard to
choices on concepts ranging from “commonality” to “reason-
ableness.” As Judge Cardozo put it in his famous lecture on
The Nature of the Judicial Process:
The decision-making freedom that judges have is an
involuntary freedom. It is the consequence of legalism’s
inability in many cases to decide the outcome… That
inability… create[s] an open area in which judges have
decisional discretion—a blank slate on which to inscribe
their decisions—rather than being compelled to a partic-
ular decision by “the law.”14
In other words, the law is not clear in many cases, leaving
even the most careful judges a window of discretion. Consider,
for example, constitutional provisions like “reasonable”
searches and seizure, “cruel” punishment, or an “adequate”
education. These clauses are ripe with vagueness; in these cir-
cumstances, judges’ interpretations of the law give them dis-
cretion based on the meaning of the provision or statute they
must interpret. 
Trial judges, in particular, have an extreme amount of dis-
cretion in their day-to-day work. These judges make discre-
tionary decisions about what evidence to admit, which wit-
nesses to believe, which jurors to seat, and which requests of
the lawyers to grant. All of these decisions typically involve
judgment calls based on credibility, a concept that is extraordi-
narily subjective. In short, even when carrying out their day-
to-day jobs, judges exercise a great deal of discretion.
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In still other cases, the law
expressly provides judges with dis-
cretion. This is obviously true
when judges sentence a defen-
dant, authorizing them to give, for
example, a fine and/or a period of
probation or a lengthy prison sen-
tence. And many of those statutes
are accompanied by specific grants
of discretion in terms of the sever-
ity of a sentence.15 While specific aggregating or mitigating
factors might be authorized by statute, determining whether or
not those factors have been satisfied is often another grant of
discretion. Again, this seems uncontroversial: that judges are
so rarely found to have abused their discretion speaks to the
conclusion that judicial discretion is, practically speaking, vir-
tually unbounded. 
THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE JUDICIAL DISCRETION
If judicial discretion is, as we have argued, an inevitable part
of the judicial process, then what factors should guide that dis-
cetion? To begin, there are some features that clearly should
not influence judicial behavior because they undermine the
rule of law. The easiest example is a bribe. Even if a decision
may be authorized by law (e.g., the defendant is statutorily
authorized to receive probation), the process leading to the
decision (the bribe) may render the decision illegitimate as a
violation of the rule of law. And we of course recognize that,
while bribery is not much of an issue in contemporary U.S.
judicial politics, it is not so unbelievable outside the geo-
graphic confines of this country. Here, campaign contributions
are an issue, and some believe that basing one’s decision on
campaign contributions is illegitimate and a violation of the
rule of law.16 This then means that how a decision is made
(procedurally proper) is important beyond the specific out-
come embraced by judges.
Still, that extralegal factors may legitimately influence judi-
cial decision making is not as strange as it may first appear.
Consider the use of legislative intent to interpret a statute.
Many judges and legal scholars believe that judges should
defer to the interpretation of a text as it was originally drafted;
by that view, judges’ discretion should be curtailed by neither
the law (strictly speaking) nor their own personal views but
rather by outsourcing interpretation of a statute or constitu-
tional provision to its original authors (or, in some instances,
to a presidential signing statement).
Or consider interpersonal dynamics among judges. Judges
on collegial courts decide cases in groups, and it is only natural
that the unique personal information they bring to the bench
might change how their colleagues exercise their discretion in
some cases.17 Justice Ginsburg made this point well when dis-
cussing the Supreme Court’s deliberations in a case involving
the strip search of a 13-year-old girl by her teachers: “They
have never been a 13-year-old girl.… It’s a very sensitive age
for a girl. I didn’t think that my colleagues, some of them, quite
understood.” After she explained to her colleagues “the trauma
such a search would have on a developing adolescent,” Gins-
burg was able to persuade her colleagues to rule that the
school’s search was unconstitutional.18 In this way, judges’
exercise of discretion might sometimes be affected by the per-
sonal views and experiences of their colleagues.
DISCRETION AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION
Naïve understandings of judicial independence sometimes
suggest that judicial independence is nothing more than decid-
ing cases independent of public opinion. As we have argued
above, this is not true. Indeed, sometimes the statutes directly
ask justices to consider public opinion. Consider Roper v. Sim-
mons (2005): “To implement this framework we have estab-
lished the propriety and affirmed the necessity of referring to
‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society’ to determine which punishments are so dis-
proportionate as to be cruel and unusual.”19 Or, to take
another example, the Miller test for obscenity asks judges to
consider: (1) whether “the average person, applying contem-
porary community standards” would find that the work,
“taken as a whole,” appeals to “prurient interests,” (2) whether
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sex-
ual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and
(3) whether the work, “taken as a whole,” lacks serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value.20 These are all cases in
which judges are specifically asked to consider what their con-
stituents might believe about a case.
Even when public opinion is not expressly implicated in the
law, there are many scenarios in which judges might quite rea-
sonably take into account the preferences of their constituents
in making their decisions. For instance:
• When the public turned against the war in Vietnam, sen-
tences for draft evasion could quite reasonably be changed
from prison time to probation under the theory that dwin-
dling support for the war no longer justified incarcerating
those who opposed the war. 
• To combat the gun epidemic in Chicago, judges could quite
reasonably announce that they intend to double the aver-
age sentence for gun-related crimes, based on the belief
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that responding to the fear of gun violence is reasonable
and that increasing penalties are likely to deter gun-toting
behavior. 
• As a means of “sending a message,” a judge could quite rea-
sonably sentence Martha Stewart to prison time for insider
trading on the stock market, this time under the theory that
majoritarian institutions decided to ban certain trading
behavior, and without meaningful enforcement and serious
penalties, the purposes of the law would be defeated.  
• When citizens vote to legalize some forms of marijuana,
judges could quite reasonably change their sentencing
behavior to give less serious sentences to those convicted of
marijuana crimes because, as a mala prohibita crime, the
definition of what constitutes a crime is to some degree
arbitrary, with whatever people think is criminal being
treated as criminal. 
• Judges who ride a circuit—especially one made up of both
rural and urban counties—could quite reasonably adjust
their sentences to take into account the degree to which a
crime constitutes a moral affront to the instant community. 
• Judges pressed to address the widespread culture of sexual
assault could quite reasonably issue sentences that assuage
the legitimate concerns among their constituents that
potential perpetrators need strong deterrents to get them to
change their behavior.
LIMITS ON THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION
We do not necessarily argue that sentences in instant cases
should consider the preferences of the judge’s constituents. But
sentences in the aggregate constitute public policy. For judges
to say that they are changing the “going rate” for particular
crimes because their constituents are worried about the crime
does not strike us as being in the least inappropriate. Or cer-
tainly it is no more inappropriate than listening to the voices
of those who say that current penalties are unfair and too
severe.
Sentencing is a different type of judicial decision, one asso-
ciated with an enormous degree of authorized discretion. We
do not argue that judges should ignore mandatory sentences if
their constituents oppose them.21 But we see no valid argu-
ments supporting the view that judges who listen to the gen-
eral sentencing preferences of their constituents are acting
improperly. Certainly, no one could rightly judge sentences
informed by the value priorities of the judge’s constituents a
violation of the rule of law. 
It is pure fantasy to suggest that, out of a range of 0 to 30
years, there is a “correct” decision, and that the judge is
uniquely in a position to know what that “correct” decision is.
Instead, we know from decades of
research on criminal courts that the
interests of the “courtroom work-
group” play an outsized role in the
decisions of that workgroup. Is it
appropriate to sentence on the basis
of a workgroup’s “going rates” for
individual crimes? What about tak-
ing into consideration the degree of
overcrowding in the prisons? Or
perhaps enhancing a sentence
because the defendant pled inno-
cent and therefore required the time, effort, and expense of a
jury trial? Or to issue lesser sentences to the clients of an attor-
ney who makes campaign contributions to the judge to get
assignments to represent indigent defendant? Much discussion
of sentencing seems to suggest that there is a “correct” sen-
tencing decision—or at least one that is best justified by the
need of the convicted for “rehabilitation.” But American pris-
ons generally fail in their rehabilitative function, and sentenc-
ing decisions are often more likely to represent the needs of the
workgroup than the needs of the convicted. 
Research on the sentencing decisions of Kansas judges
offers a useful case study of the conflict between the needs of
the criminal court workgroup and the preferences of the
judges’ constituents. 
THE SENTENCING BEHAVIOR OF KANSAS JUDGES
Much has been made of the findings that judges change their
behavior over the course of the electoral cycle—scholars are
particularly concerned about the research findings of Huber
and Gordon, Gordon and Huber, and Berdejó and Yuchtman.22
The assumption is that decisions made in proximity to an elec-
tion are improper (the word “pander” is often used) and that
decisions made outside the electoral period (however defined)
are proper. To be clear, “proper” and “improper” are normative
judgments, not empirical findings. All the data themselves
show is that the behavior differs at different points-in-time. For
instance, “when election is imminent, judges in competitive
districts are 7.1%. . . .more likely to sentence a convict to time
in prison and, conditional on incarceration, assign sentences
6.3 months longer than their counterparts in retention dis-
tricts.”23 In general, some scholars are much concerned about
serious bias against criminal defendants in states that elect their
judges. We, however, are less concerned.
For simplicity, let us assume two periods of decision mak-
ing—a period under external scrutiny (the election period)
and a period not under external scrutiny (the non-election
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period). What we mean by “exter-
nal” is that in the period not
under scrutiny, the courtroom
workgroup (the prosecutor, the
defense attorney, and the judge) is
able to implement its preferences
without constraint. Assume for a
moment that prosecutors are
motivated by producing as high a “conviction rate” as possible,
defense attorneys (and defendants) primarily want no jail time,
and judges shoot for a record of not ever being overturned on
appeal. All of these motivations fuel the plea-bargaining
process. 
Now, few have ever argued that the sentences handed out
under plea bargaining are rationally designed. Crimes typically
are associated with a “going rate,” around which increments
and decrements are sought. An important goal of the process is
conflict minimization and maintenance of the relationships
among the repeat players—the courtroom workgroup. Under
these circumstances, the average sentence for a second convic-
tion on burglary might be on the order of four years, a very far
cry indeed from the maximum sentence for the crime provided
by the state legislature (a parameter that so many decry as an
unreasonable, even if largely irrelevant, decision by a majori-
tarian institution). 
Our point is simple. Assume Huber and Gordon are correct
about temporal variability in sentencing. Could it not be that
the sentences issued under periods without scrutiny are sen-
tences that primarily serve the benefits of the courtroom work-
group, and that those sentences are “too low” (whatever that
means)? When under scrutiny, the actors in the workgroup are
compelled to consider societal interests more strongly, and
therefore cannot “give away the store” just to secure a guilty
plea from a defendant. To treat sentences in the non-electoral
period as somehow more rational (e.g., tailored to fit the reha-
bilitation needs of the defendant) does not at all fit with the
reality of plea bargaining in American criminal courts. If the
workgroup is simply negotiating self-serving sentences in the
non-election period, then the scrutiny that comes during the
electoral period may actually be desirable from the point-of-
view of the public good.  
Let us assume that the constituents generally want a sen-
tence of +6 months, or, more precisely, +6.3 months. We take
this figure from the finding of Gordon and Huber that judges
in competitive districts in Kansas “assign sentences 6.3 months
longer than their counterparts in retention districts.”24 Clearly,
many observers view this additional 6.3 months as undesir-
able. But the only criterion they apparently use to make this
judgment is that of defendant preferences. We completely
agree that it is reasonable to assume that convicted criminals
would prefer to spend X months in jail rather than X + 6.3
months in jail. 
So, convicted criminal defendants want less jail time and
constituents want more.25 Without some ancillary theoretical
apparatus, it is not at all clear to us why the preferences of the
defendants should be treated as superior to the preferences of
the constituents.  
We should readily admit that we do not necessarily agree
with the view that guilty criminal defendants are somehow
entitled to lenient sentences. We would not, for example, nec-
essarily object to a convicted burglar getting 5.6 years of incar-
ceration rather than 5.0 years. We would not agree with a sen-
tence outside the range of available penalties proscribed by
statute (of course). More generally, we would most likely agree
with sentencing decisions that are transparent and subject to
scrutiny. But simply to say that +6.3 months is somehow
wrong, and because it is wrong, the method of selecting judges
is wrong, strikes us as entirely too simplistic. 
What if the people of Kansas realized how expensive it is to
incarcerate convicts and therefore shifted to a preference of 
-6.3 months for the average sentence? Would it be appropriate
for the sentencing judges to respond to these changed prefer-
ences? If so, then the culprit critics identify is not necessarily
judges responding to the preferences of their constituents
(because they are elected, not appointed), but rather that the
constituents currently hold “bad” preferences. It that is true,
then perhaps the palliative is to change the constituents, not
the methods of selecting judges.  
“PANDERING?”
Scholars who write about the role of public opinion in court
decisions often use the word “pander” when referring to incor-
porating constituent preferences into the factors guiding the
exercise of judicial discretion. According to the Oxford English
Dictionary, the verb “pander” refers “to act as a pander; to min-
ister to the immoral urges or distasteful desires of another;” or,
“in weakened use: to indulge the tastes, whims, or weaknesses
of another.”26 Critics use this term, we suspect, under the
assumption that the preferences of the constituents are ill-
informed, or just simply irrational. We strongly suspect that
many who read the Huber and Gordon findings are disgusted
that the American people unreasonably seem to prefer more
punitive rather than less punitive sentences. This is just one
more charge in what is often a comprehensive indictment of
the American people for being know-nothing dolts when it
comes to law and politics. 
Many have argued that judges ought not to “pander” to the
“whims” of their constituents. Of course, framing the question
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sentencing or other policy decisions, just as (we hope) no one
argues for complete judicial independence—or that the life
terms of the highly unaccountable U.S. Supreme Court justices
should be expanded to other judicial officers. No one argues
that the majority ought to get its way in all policy decisions,
judicial or otherwise; and we are not sanguine about the diffi-
culty of specifying when the majority has the right to get its
way and when minority rights must trump majority prefer-
ences. Clearly, there must be constraints on the degree of
accountability and constraints on the degree of independence.  
But we do argue that a large number of policy decisions
made by judges ought not to ignore the preferences of the
judges’ constituents. The enforceability of mandatory arbitra-
tion terms in contracts that nearly all do not read and do not
understand is not an issue, for example, on which the prefer-
ences of the American people ought to be ignored. And, we
contend, there is absolutely nothing wrong in a democracy that
decides its judges should be elected and in which the con-
stituents of the judges vote on the basis of whether they agree
with the policy decisions of the judicial candidates. For judges
to hide behind judicial independence, unsupported claims to
the superiority of judicial judgments over the preferences of
the constituents, and distain for the rationality of public opin-
ion is unwarranted. 
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in this fashion prejudges the conclusion. It assumes that con-
stituents do not have meaningful policy preferences and that to
respond to these meaningless preferences is to gratify or
indulge an immoral or distasteful desire, need, or habit or a
person with such a desire. We do not in this essay speak in
favor of pandering.
Constituents differ—and differ legitimately—on what they
view the function of sentencing to be (just as scholars and pol-
icy makers differ). Some may favor general deterrence, while
others seek special deterrence. Some may favor retributive jus-
tice; others seek restorative justice. Some may view the role
and preferences of the victim to be determinative; others may
think that victims ought to be excluded from the sentencing
process. 
Constituents also have many legal policy preferences that
are a far cry from being whims. Attitudes toward abortion, for
instance, are often grounded in considered moral ideologies,
and are also often informed by science and medicine.27 The
belief that harsher sentences will deter crime may or may not
be entirely supported by scientific evidence, but because it is
not does not mean that it is a whim that can be ignored (just
as, out of faith, many scientists believe that life as we know it
must exist somewhere in the universe). Relatedly, the position
that the only way to stop sexual assaults in this country is by
stepped-up prosecutions and lengthy and harsh penalties may
be derived after considerable thought and deliberation. Simi-
larly, the judgment that employment-at-will is an antiquated
and unfair legal doctrine can be a considered view that is well
grounded in other beliefs. Even the political preference that
Americans should withdraw all troops from Afghanistan
should hardly be treated, on its face, as a whim to which pres-
idents and legislators ought not to pander. Ordinary people
hold views on legal issues that may not be embedded in a well-
articulated and logical ideological frameworks, but that does
not mean that their preferences on issues such as issuing sen-
tences of life imprisonment without parole or seizing private
property for private development are whimsical, ill-informed,
or unreasonable. 
Finally, those who make the “whim” and “pandering” argu-
ments typically (if not always) produce not a scintilla of proof
in support of their views. How does one determine whether
public opinion is a “whim” that ought to be ignored or a con-
sidered judgment? Critics typically use phrases like “pander-
ing” to refer to representatives who represent views the critics
disliked; for views with which they agree, phrases like “repre-
sentative democracy” or even “the wisdom of the crowd” are
more likely to be used.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
No one, of course, argues that judges ought to do nothing
but look to the preferences of their constituents when making
27. Indeed, by some accounts, the science that undergirded Roe v.
Wade (e.g., regarding viability) is no longer accepted, so the fac-
tual basis of Roe may well have been very seriously undermined.
See Chelsea Conaboy, The Abortion Debate Doesn’t Change, But the
Science of Abortion Does, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 31, 2018)
https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2018/08/31/the-abortion-
debate-doesn-change-but-science-abortion-does/smHRPvw5XDk-
TXzMUrADawK/story.html.
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